

OLD & MODERN WARS – POLITIC'S MOBILE CENTRES OF GRAVITY

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Abstract: *Peace and war are important words which cover a large spectrum of life. They are important for mankind because of them assure enough space for living in a friendly environment or can turn off the light of hope. Modern wars have tried to solve so many issues, in so many ways, that the strategists try to melt all circumstances to discover relevant elements of the initial time and to understand the reasons of starting. There are struggles among them because everyone tries to show the better way in which a war can be predictable, or can be stopped, or can be prolonged in order to assure necessary time to reach the planned objectives. Nowadays there are important mutations to enhance the theory of war, in order to achieve the level of supremacy. Modern wars have to be confronted with new strategies that must cover the whole spectrum of political-military will.*

Key words: *intelligence cycle, mission, coalition, allied, decision-making, military.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The wars of all times and in all forms (civil, interstate, revolutionary etc.) have had and will have all ingredients needed to determine decision makers (political-military and military) not to let certain tolerance levels fall below the acceptance in order to maintain their political, economic or social systems. According to the phenomenon thinkers, the war must resolve paradigm to which a society has reached and cannot continue in the same direction because of rifts between civil society and the political and military divisions that often go beyond the political boundaries state.

Modern war is somewhat different from those already entered in the history books. Modern wars foundations are far deeper, being strong accelerated by transformations which take place globally. Major global changes will redefine the moral values of war in the context of achieving of some common values, values that can be imposed from certain levels.

Who will be the ones to decide if the correct trigger to determine a new military conflict is? What are the motivations that determine taking such a decision? Where should act to preserve the values and ideals of society? There are solutions backed by strong arguments to stop thinking in violent way?

To these questions we have had a lot of answers and rumors in the last 2,500 years, starting from Sun Tzu's time, who explains the motivations that led to that kind of decisions, and, of course, their description.

And Machiavelli help us to clarify these with his philosophy presenting that the Prince *should take decisions* (act) to ensure state security. Then we have the famous dictum „*L'Etat c'est moi*” of Louis XIV, King of France, saying that “he is well and if his state fills in the same way”.

Regarding arguments can be reminded Richard English, the author of the *Modern War - A very short introduction*, says that the History teaches us that "behind every war there are some lies as justification" and, also, as a different meaning, Mr. Herbert George Wells, a British specialist, who says that the essence of modern wars is *the massacre of boys / killing youth*.

In thousands of years of evolution, mankind has witnessed of multiple internal disputes inside each society, and external, related to the domination between states and neighbors. The dispute solving required the involvement of trained /skilled persons (strategists) who had the capacity to predict which might be the following action of the enemy, which can be in offense or defense.

The emergence of CoGs as strategic and operational elements of the war has been noted since ancient times by strategists like Sun Tzu and Sun Bin and later by Machiavelli, but one who had brought into the actually question was Clausewitz, who said that war, properly interpreted, is a rational instrument of politics, the end of the politics itself, but which cannot be treated separately from the policy itself. CoGs theory is now very interpreted and disputed, since it is considered both relevant and irrelevant, as part of operational planning.

The annihilation of the CoGs as a fundamental part of the war represents in the opinion of many a continuous planning process, execution, tracking and identifying of the constituent elements as the core business of the intelligence structures.

The characteristic elements, both real and abstract, are designed to be the source from which the armed forces derive their will to continue the fight.

This willing must be strongly supported by the available resources and capabilities, both for own forces and for the coalition to which States belong.

In the annihilation / neutralization process of CoGs the primary role lies to the operational planning team, and the decisive one to the commander. The commander's decision can turn an enemy's CoG in a source of power for future operations of own forces.

Harnessing this may be the moment of winning initiative. Stupefying and capturing enemy and its depot /warehouses can ensure the support for own forces offensive (eg. fuel for tanks and armored vehicles) especially when logistic structures cannot keep up the offensive rhythm (situation encountered in the Second World War).

The offensive approach was explained for the first time by Sun Tzu, and it relies heavily on intelligence forces in finding / identifying all CoGs, and on coordination and leading of forces to neutralize them. Hidden, conceal and deception military operations represent suitable actions to fulfill own missions without attracting enemy in battle.

Winning the war without fighting rises to the highest forms of military philosophy encountered especially in Chinese and Japanese philosophies.

Modern states, evolved - as Clausewitz called them, were engaged in open conflict, having numerous armies and large losses, left no room for ambiguity in the interpretation of the final results of the battles. The appearance may present a moment in time (several years) as a safe form of interpretation, but in terms of decades the option is useless and history has shown this.

Beating France by the German Empire in 1871 was not a final capitulation of France, even losing territories. Than the First World War was the first time retaliation slightly overshadowed by the US decision to waive certain reparations? Then, World War II represented the time to reverse the desire for revenge; Germany has defeated France for another five years. So we can say that without having a good and endorsed balance the war will reignite.

CoGs exploitation, expressed in quantities and perceptions, shows a very good knowledge of the phenomenon in general and particularly and other particular adjacent. Knowing the opponent's culture ensure correct interpretation of abstract CoGs, thereby avoiding the planning of some operations that can injure the pride and beliefs of conquered population, or which will be dominated.

Avoiding confrontations where there is no case requires a correct interpretation of the battle space, intelligence and planning activities which are dedicated to the implementation of operational plans designed on the basis of positive reasons.

Knowing the enemy's forces structure, layout, power struggle, reserves, ways of communication, naval and air support, artillery and anti-aircraft etc., ensure the preparation of plans that, first, we must fully protect our forces. Losses due to bad planning cannot be regenerated as we unfold attacks, and affects in a major way the offensive rhythm.

On the other hand trying to interrupt or diminish the links established at political-diplomatic level means, also, an important issue of war.

The deception's features regarding the establishment of alliances are listed by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Machiavelli. All pointed out the establishment or maintaining liaison with allies to ensure a dominant position or cover the role of political-military diplomacy to achieve the breakthrough in the political and diplomatic connections of the opponent.

In the history of the Romanian People there are many situations where leaders have applied this kind of tactics in order to be able to defeat the invaders.

A relevant example is King Dromichaete who was able to defeat the most powerful king of his time, the King of Macedonia, Asia Minor and Thrace, Lysimachus. Although Lysimachus benefited from the advantages of an impressive army (approx. 100,000 fighters) very well trained (using phalanx as the successful battle formation type) and equipped, could not defeat the Geto-Dacian army, due to combat tactics adopted by the Geto-Dacian were not complementary to the Macedonian forms of fight (they avoided direct combat with the whole army in the open field).

Early knowing of opponent plans is a major asset that can turn the fate of war. Another important element is the knowledge of opponent's using of tactics, techniques and procedures. Lysimachus very proud not accept the initial defeat, forcing his army to go through hostile territory, only to take the revenge.

Thus, Dromichaetes compelled Lysimachus to fight where, when and how he decided, using successful the characteristics of the own land due to very good knowledge of the battle space.

The CoG is important and decisive step in structuring the war. It represents a great capability, powerhouse and freedom of movement and has dominant characteristics.

All summed will ensure the reaching of final objectives or to achieve the final status of the political decision. Clausewitz said that *"war is a natural continuation of politics, and diplomacy, because of where diplomacy fails the war starts"*.

In 2011, the diplomatic talks inside the United Nations Security Council have solved only a half of Syrian problems, namely the problem of chemical weapons, although there was a consensus among the five members.

Regarding the situation of political system change, the two sides have not reached a consensus, for which was triggered an internal war, which later has expanded in several states around Syrian borders.

Regarding the conflict in Ukraine, the warfare opened here represents also a result of failed diplomacy. The CoGs are numerous, some of them clear, others diffuse, real and abstract at the same time. New Ukraine has to face with new problems which interesting are coming from the past history of the USSR, when numerous Soviet leaders have struggled to uproot the Ukrainian people (eg. 1932-1933 Ukrainian famine - Holodomor), which have not been forgotten and cannot be forgotten. Usually, these abstract CoGs figure out an impetus to combat power across that acquired through training, unleashes huge energies, otherwise unseen in other circumstances.

Disputes between military blocs are the most destructive since it involves multiple forces and capabilities. Maintaining confusion and effervescence provides the framework for failed diplomacy and conflict beginning. The situation in eastern Ukraine is held in tension, as the participants follow different purposes. One is to maintain the authority over the Donetsk and Lugansk regions which are the most industrialized in Ukraine, and other is to increase the military spending, and testing new capabilities developed in recent years.

Regarding the morality of war, Howard Michael Eliot and Peter Paret, who analyzed in detail the work of Clausewitz, consider that elements of morality are and should be the most important in the war. Morality, as history is on the side of defender. If the defender lost the war morality facts will be presented by winners.

2. THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERN WAR

Modern war benefits from all values acquired during past conflicts.

The war culture is vast and diverse, with different understandings and concerns.

Although globally are accepted numerous strategists and thinkers, great military states have adopted only few philosophies, usually internal (Russia, USA, China, Israel, etc.), which resonate with their policies, objectives and aims.

Maintaining large armies, heavily equipped and benefiting from new technologies allow to promote offensive policies against some states trying to get out of the sphere of influence or derail from the Community's ideology.

The threat of use of force under its various capabilities represents the same typology used in other historical periods, with the difference that the means /capabilities used are more refined.

In terms of capabilities there is serious concern for the development of new ones or to adjust old ones in connection with researches conducted into military and civilian environments.

Applications are continually updated and simulated exercises are increasingly take place of the real ones due to lower costs. However, digitization and unfailing role of computer in the future military actions provide an instantaneous exchange of information between commanders and soldiers.

Knowing the three-dimensional battle space, the structure and position of the enemy forces and TTPs provide a rapid adjustment of battle to gain the initiative.

Applying classical theories to not engage the enemy where it is strong and to be ready to bypass the heavily defended areas during the offensive, provides enough space for specialized troops to fight against this soldiers (e.g. fighting in the village). Application of preemptive action and their policies to ensure freedom of movement when the situation cannot be a subject of dispute for international political structures established globally.

In recent years modern war is much more diversified, provides much greater freedom of movement and ultimately could be planned as a military operation that, if it is covered by a UN resolution becomes also moral.

Also, the means of action have diversified greatly in the last 50 years. Modern war is essentially an economic war, and affects the critical infrastructure of isolated state, and the population that most often does not speak for the political decision.

Russian actions in Chechnya in two wars were not received with sympathy neither the troops (some of them refused to fight against their own population) nor civilians, especially neighbors of Chechen people.

The difference of ideology, from the political one to the religious one causes other divisions that are often misinterpreted through ignorance or intentionally. The ideology has been and will be the engine of political and military disputes through cultivating nationalist and chauvinistic ideas among own population. Growing up in a toxic environment provides the necessary ideological formation of a hostile population, fundamentally interested in preserving their values.

3. CONCLUSION

Modern war will continue to respond to all political demands, as the last step of diplomacy. Military doctrines will meet their interests and group growing up within alliances to meet common interests. Nations will continue to arm themselves, activity which has started with a great aplomb in 2015, after 25 years of decreasing importance of military cause. The emergence of some leaders who want to change international treaties and customs arrangements will lead to a repositioning of forces around the globe, causing mutations in areas with high impact and elusive to all states (control of the seas and oceans and space). The past 70 years have brought a dramatic change in the level of developing armaments. A global conflict can have unforeseen effects through using all capabilities, classical and nuclear, which can lead to the disappearance / extinction of what today provides the source of food or /and life. In this way the operational level will become very active, and training of troops must ensure the level of security desired. Cooperation and dialogue are the only tools that can preserve a lasting peace in the interest of all, if someone's planned goals and objectives does not disturb the very existence of partners. The study of peace and war must continue, because nobody will solve the problem of peace balance or the beginning of war.

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